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CASENOTES
in a prior advisory opinion ruled that a pardon blotted out the offense in
the eyes of the law.18 The court has not literally interpreted this "blotting
out" theory since it later held that a pardon does not restore one to the
practice of law;' nor will it preclude revocation of a license to practice
medicine.2a They consider proceedings for a criminal act and for disbarment
as separate and distinct, and a pardon for the former is not a pardon for
the latter.2 1 These decisions, however, concerned license privileges and did
not construe the habitual offender law.
In tile principal case the court bases its decision upon an exclusionary
rule of statutory construction. It was concluded that it was the legislative
intent to exclude pardoned offenses by not expressly including them in the
habitual offender law"22 A cardinal rule of statutory construction provides
that a statute is to be construed according to the intent of the legislature.
23
All other rules of statutory consrucion are subordinate and are mere aids in
determining legislative intent.2 4 It is submitted it may have been the intent
of the legislature to include pardoned offenses in the application of this
law. However, these statutes should have no bearing when a pardon is
given because of innocence, since the elcment of criminal habit is not
present. The habitual offender laws are designed (o deter crime and thereby
to protect society. These statutes are not directed to any particular crime
but only to the recurrent offender.
The criminal character or habits of the individual, the chief postu-
late of the habitual criminal statutes, is often as clearly disclosed
by a pardoned conviction as by one never condoned. '''
IvA W. KAY, JR.
NEGLIGENCE-GUEST STATUTE-
RIGHT OF RECOVERY
The plaintiff sued for the wrongful death of her minor child who was
killed while riding as a guest in the defendant's automobile. Held, the guest
statute' applied, thus precluding the plaintiff from recovering where the
18. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor of Florida, 14 Fa. 318 (1872).
19. State v. Snyder, 136 Fla. 875, 187 So. 381 (1939).
20. Page v. Watsom, 140 Fla. 536, 192 So. 205 (1938); State v. lazzard, 139
Wash. 487, 247 Pac. 957 (1926); accord, Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E.2d
393 (1941).
21. Branch v. State, 120 Fla. 666, 163 So. 48 (1935).
22. Kelley v. State, 204 Ind. 612, 185 N.E. 453 (1933); State v. Martin, 59
Ohio St. 212, 52 N.E. 188 (1898); contra, People v. Biggs, 9 Cal.2d 508, 71 P.2d
214 (1937).
23. State v. Taylor, 80 So.2d 618 (Ala. 1954); Abood v. City of Jacksonville,
80 So.2d 443 ([-a. 1955); Crawford v. School Dist. 6, 342 Mich. 564, 70 N.W.2d
789 (1955).
24. United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540 (1938); Johnson v. Southern Pac.,
196 U.S. 1 (1904); State v. Doran, 124 Conn. 160, 198 AtI. 573 (1938).
25. People v. Biggs, 9 Cal.2d 508, 71 P.2d 214, 216 (1937).
1. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1955).
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death was the result of simple negligence. Brailsford v. Campbell, 89 So.2d
241 (Fla. 1956).
In the absense of a guest statute, the general rule in almost all jurisdic-
tions is that the person operating or responsible for the operation of an
automobile must exercise reasonable and ordinary care for the safety of a
guest therein.2 However, a majority of the states have so-called "automobile
guest statutes."'3 A few other jurisdictions have adopted the guest rule by
judicial decision.
4
Generally, these statutes preclude the guest from recovering from his
host for injuries sustained due to the latter's simple negligence. The statutes
require a finding of "gross negligence," 5 "wilful and wanton misconduct,",,
and/or "intoxication" 7 on the part of the driver in order for the guest
to recover.
In those jurisdictions which have adopted guest statutes a problem
arises when the guest dies. Must the plaintiff prove gross negligence as
would have been required of the guest? Or does the death statute which
requires only simple negligence pre-empt the field? In all but two8 states
which subscribe to the "automobile guest" doctrine, the beneficiaries under
the wrongful death statutes may not recover for the death of a guest in the
absence of gross negligence.
2. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 399 (la) (1949).
3. ALA. CODE Tit. 36, § 95 (1940), AmK. STATS. § 75-913 (1947), CAL. VEHICLE
CODE § 403 (1947), COLO. STAT. ANN. C. 16, § 371 (1935), DEL. CODE ANN. Tit.
21, 6101 (1953), FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1955), IDAHO CODE § 49-1001 (1947), S.H.
ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 95 , § 58 (1941), BURNS' ANNO. IND. STATS. § 47-1021 (1952),
IOWA COvE ANN. § 321.494 (1949), KAN. GEN. STAT. § 8-122 (1949), MICH. CON1&P.
LAWS § 256.29 (1948), MONT. REV. CODES § 32-1113 (1947), NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 39-740 (1943), NEv. Comp. LAWS § 4439 (1931-1947 Supp.), N.M. STAT. § 64-24-1
(1953), N.D. RFv. CODE § 39-1502 (1943), OHIo Rrv. CODE § 4515.02 (1953), ORE.
REV. STAT. § 30.110(1955), S.C. CoDE OF LAws Tit. 46 § 46-801 (1952), S.D. ConE
§ 44.0362 (1939), T x. ClV. STAT. Art. 6701b (Vernon 1925), UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 41-9-1 (1953), VT. STAT. REV. § 10,223 (1947), VA. CODE § 8-646.1 (1950),
WASH. REV. CODE § 46.08.080 (1951), 'WYo. CoMP. STAT. § 60-1201 (1945).
4. Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399, 106 S.E.297 (1921); Massaletti v. Fitzroy,
228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917).
5. See statutes cited in note 2 supra for Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Montana,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming,
6. See statutes cited note 2 supra for Alabama, California (just "willful"),
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, North Dakota (just "willful"), Ohio, South
Dakota, Utah (just "willful"), and Wyoming.
7. See statutes cited note 2 supra for California, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Oregon, and Utah. Other terms used are: "intentional" (Colorado,
Delaware, Idaho, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington),"reckless disregard" (Idaho, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, and Texas), "wilful
and wanton disregard" (Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, and Virginia), "heedlessness"
(New Mexico, South Carolina, and Texas), "reckless operation" (Iowa and Montana),
"wanton negligence" (Kansas), and "wilful negligence" (Vermont).
8. In Massachusetts the beneficiary of a wrongful death statute may recover for
simple negligence. Gallup v. Lazott, 271 Mass. 406, 171 N.E. 658 (1930); Shapiro
v. Lyon, 254 Mass. 110, 149 N.E. 543 (1925); Flynn v. Lewis, 231 Mass. 550, 121
N.E. 493 (1919). The question is still undecided in Delaware.
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The results are not all reached in the same manner. The rationale
depends on the provisions of the statute involved. There are three basic
types of guest statutes. All require the higher degree of culpability previ-
ously mentioned. The effect of the first type is to restrict the guest's right
of recovery.9 The second limits the liability of the owner or operator, 10
and the third type precludes either the guest or his survivors from main-
taining an action in the absence of gross negligence." Only the first class
of statute appears to allow the beneficiaries to maintain their action on
simple negligence. Fifteen states have guest statutes of this nature.'2 In
nine of these states the wrongful death statute permits recovery only in
cases where the deceased could have prevailed had he lived. 13 Four of the
six remaining states have wrongful death statutes which do not predicate
9. ARK. STATS. § 75-913 (1947), CAL., VEHICLE CODE § 403 (1947), COLO.
STAT. ANN. C. 16, § 371 (1935), DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 21, § 6101 (1953), FLA. STAT.
§ 320.59 (1955), IDAHO CODE § 49-1001 (1947), KAN. GEN. STAT. § 8-122 (1949),
MICH. COMP. LAws § 256.29 (1948), N. M. STAT. § 64-24-1 (1953), ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 30.110 (1955), S. C. CODE OF LAws Tit. 46 § 46-801 (1952), S. D. CODE § 44.0362
(1939), TEX CIv. STAT. Art. 6701 b (Vernon 1925), WASH. REV. CODE § 46.08.080
(1951), WYo. COMP. STAT. § 60-1201 (1945). Typical of these is Florida's:
No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his
guest or passenger, without payment for such transportation, shall have a catse
of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss,
in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the gross
negligence or willful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of such
motor vehicle, and unless such gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct
was the proximate cause of the injury, death or loss, for which the action is
brought ....
10. ALA. CODE Tit. 36, § 95 (1940), BuRNs' ANNo. IND. STATS. § 47-1021 (1952),
IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.494 (1949), MONT. REV. CoDEs § 32-1113 (1947), NEB.
REV. STAT. § 39-790 (1943), OHio REV. CODE § 4515.02 (1953), VT. STAT. REV.
§ 10,223 (1947). Alabama's statute is representative:
The owner, operator or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle
shall not be liable for loss or damages arising from injuries to or death of a
guest while being transported without payment therefor, unless such injuries
or death are caused by the willful or wanton misconduct of such operator,
owner or person responsible for the operation of said motor vehicle.
11. S. H. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 95 i, § 58 (1941), NEV. COMP. LAws § 4439
(1931-1947 Supp.), N. D. REv. CODE § 39-1502 (1943), UTAhI CODE ANN. § 41-9-1
(1953), VA. CODE § 8-646.1 (1950). A good example is North Dakota's statute:
Any person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle moving upon any
of the public highways of this state, and who while so riding as such guest
receive or sustains an injury, shall have no right of recovery against the owner or
driver or person responsible for the operation of such vehicle. In the event
that such person while so riding as such guest is killed or dies as the result
of an injury sustained while so riding as such guest, then neither the
estate nor the legal representatives nor heirs of such guest shall have any
right of recovery against the driver or owner of said vehicle by reason of
the death of such guest . . . . The provisions of this chapter shall not be
construed as relieving the owner, driver, or person responsible for the operation
of a vehicle from liability for injury to or death of a guest proximately resulting
from the intoxication, willful misconduct, or gross negligence of such owner,
driver, or person responsible for the operation of such vehicle.
12. See note 8 supra.
13. ARK. STATS. § 27-903 (1947), COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 50, § 2 (1935), KAN.
CEN. STAT. § 60-3201 (1949), Micn. ComP. LAWs § 691.581 (1948), N. M. STAT.
§ 22-20-1 (1953). S. C. COD OF LAws Tit. 10 § 10-1951 (1952), S. D. CODE
§ 37.2201 (1952 Supp.), TEX. CIv. STAT. Art. 4671-72 (Vernon 1925), WYo. Comp.
STAT. § 3-403 (1945).
MIAMI LAW OQUARTERLY
recovery on the deceased's cause of action. 4 Of these four, those in Idaho
and \Vashington have been interpreted in the courts as not allowing recovery
if the deceased never had a cause of action.' 5 The same result has been
reached in California, apparently without noticing the conflict.. The
issue has eluded the Delaware court. Oregon, like Florida, has two wrongful
death statutes. That is, each state has a statute which gives a parent a
cause of action for the death of a minor child with no mention made of
the child's cause of action had he lived,' 7 and each also has a statute which
gives an administrator a cause of action for wrongful death only in cases
where the deceased would have had a right of recovery had death not
ensued.' s
In the instant case the majority of the court disregarded the express
words of the statute allowing recovery by the parent for the death of a
minor child and held that the legislature had really meant to say that the
parent could recover only if the child could have recovered had death not
ensued. All the states which have adopted a guest statute have arrived at
the same result. But in reading the statutes it is quite apparent that in
most cases the legislatures have failed to realize that the wording they
have used is ambiguous.
FRANK M. DUNBAUGII IIt
14. CAL. CODE oir Civ. PROCEDUE. § 377 (1949), DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 10,
§ 3704 (1953), InAn CODE § 5-310 (1947), \VAsr. REIv. CODE § 4.20.010 and
4.24.010 (1951).
15. llelgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 34 P.2d 957 (1934); Upchurch v.
Hubbard, 29 Wash. 2d 559, 188 P.2d 82 (1947).
16. Davis v. Oldendorph, 130 Cal. App. 2d 314, 278 P.2d 956 (1955); Humphreys
v. San Francisco Area Council, B.S.A., 22 Cal.2d 436, 139 P.2d 941 (1943); Howard v.
Howard, 132 Cal. App. 124, 22 P.2d 279 (1933).
17. FLA. STAT. § 768.03 (1955), ORE. REv. STAT. § 30.010 (1955). The recent
case of Whang v. Hougum, 61 Ore. Adv. Sh. 589, 290 P.2d 185, aff'd, 61 Ore. Adv.
Sh. 677, 291 P.2d 720 (1955) has interpreted the Oregon statute in the same way
that the instant case has interpreted Florida's. 'The Oregon court actually grasped hold
of the conflicts, though, and reasoned then out.
18. FLA. STAT. § 768.02 (1955), ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.020 (1955).
